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This edition of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy focuses
on the area of international criminal law concerned with the prosecution of mass
atrocities. This subset of law is sometimes referred to as the "core crimes" in
international criminal law, but the field is so new that the accepted terminology
remains fluid. What is not in dispute is that the field is concerned with the
perpetration of four categories of crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity and the crime of aggression.' The modem era of the core crimes is in its
infancy; it is just over twenty years old. The law and practice in the field is as
varied as the countries that have assumed leadership roles at the various tribunals
and courts. With two decades of rulings, decisions and judgments, the process of
reflection on this rich and diverse body of precedent occurs in journals around the
world. This edition hopes to add to this growing scholarship.
The process of understanding the core crimes law and practice begins in the
aftermath of WWI, where the terms of surrender imposed on the Germans by the
Treaty of Versailles included a provision for the prosecution of the German leader
Kaiser Wilhelm.2 The victorious powers quickly lost their appetite to prosecute the
Kaiser and the Kaiser himself was not particularly keen on the idea.3 Twenty-four
years later, the major allied forces of WWII revisited the notion of juridical
accountability. In 1943, Winston Churchill, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Joseph
Stalin met at Tehran and fundamentally agreed on the terms for prosecuting the
Third Reich once the hostilities had been concluded.4 Two and half years later this
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resulted in the International Military Tribunal ("IMT"), 5 or Nuremberg trial as it is
commonly known. The IMT prosecuted nineteen top surviving Nazi leaders which
the world hailed as a new alternative to retributive force.6 While the IMT was
successful politically, it was heavily criticized in legal communities. To many
legal practitioners and academicians, the IMT was the archetypal example of
victor's justice and a poor model for the establishment of an enduring rule of law.7
But it created momentum for the continued development of the law as a response
to force. The IMT was a baby step. The post-war optimism spawned the great
thinkers of the time to visualize what future tribunals might accomplish.
This optimism was short-lived as the Cold War abruptly stopped the
momentum for the next iteration of tribunals. The freeze-out would last until the
demise of the Soviet Union. In 1989, a new political order was at hand and the
prospect of law as a response to force was renewed. Only four years later the
aspirations of international criminal law were fully realized with the United
Nations creating an international tribunal to prosecute persons most responsible for
the planning and commission of crimes in the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY").8 The
floodgates were opened.
Some twenty-three years later, the movement that began with the ICTY has
spawned a variety of tribunals and courts that have embarked on the prosecutions
of core crimes. The courts have included international ad hoc tribunals such as the
ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"); 9 hybrid
international courts such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL"),' ° the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)" and the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon ("STL"); 12 domestic chambers with an internationalized
See also Office of the Historian, The Tehran Conference, 1943, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
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Nuremberg Trial]; see also International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, TRACK IMPUNITY ALWAYS
[TRIAL] (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/tribunals/international-military-
tribunals/tribunal-militaire-intemational-de-nuremberg/creation.html.
5. Charter of the Int'l Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; see also Office of the
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component such as the Bosnian War Crimes Chambers;13 regional organization
sponsored courts such Extraordinary African Chambers ("EAC")' 4 in Senegal; and
internationalized courts authorized by states functioning under U.N.
administrations, such as The Special Panels of the Dili District Court in East
Timor.15 Moreover, in 1998 the dream of a permanent court came true with the
creation of the International Criminal Court ("ICC") in 1998.16
These different tribunals and courts that have ventured into the realm of
international criminal law quickly realized that international law does not occur in
a vacuum. Every tribunal has had to balance an array of legal, political, social and
cultural considerations. They must balance punishment and retribution with
reconciliation and institution building. They must balance the benefit of
international involvement against the need to have a national process for
reconciliation. And they must balance the expectation of international norms of
due process against their need to deliver justice in a form that is familiar to their
constituents.
The complicated process of addressing all of these competing concerns leads
to each tribunal having its own form and peculiarities. The articles presented in
this edition elegantly speak to these variations. Beth van Schaack's article, The
Building Blocks of Hybrid Justice, comprehensively studies the structural, political
and cultural differences between the tribunals and courts and how these differences
affects performance.17 But in addition, Ms. Van Schaack examines the nuances
and subtle pressures that have played an underappreciated role in determining how
these judicial enterprises ultimately function. 18
Kerstin Bree Carlson's article, Reconciliation Through a Judicial Lens:
Competing Legitimation Frameworks in the ICTY's Plavgi,6 and Babik Judgments,
examines how a single tribunal could take similar cases and produce two different
results.'9 In marked contrast to the Van Schaack, Carlson looks at variations
13. Bogdan Ivanigevi6, The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina: From Hybrid to
Domestic Court 40-41 (2008), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-FormerYugoslavia-
Domestic-Court-2008-English.pdf.
14. Statut des Chambres Africaines Extraordinaires au sein des Juridictions Srndgalaises pour la
Poursuite des Crimes Intemationaux Commis au Tchad durant la Pdriode du 7 Juin 1982 au ler
Ddcembre 1990 [Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese courts for the
prosecution of international crimes committed in Chad during the period from 7 June 1982 to I
December 19901, art 2, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/node/248651
(establishing the EAC).
15. UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/15, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6,2000). (establishing
The Special Panels of the Dili District Court in East Timor); see also UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/11, U.N.
Doe. UNTAET/REG/2000/I1 9.5 (Mar. 6, 2000).
16. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 125(3), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
38544 (establishing the ICC).
17. Beth Van Schaack, The Building Blocks of Hybrid Justice, 44 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 169
(2015).
18. Id.
19. Kerstin Bree Carlson, Reconciliation Through a Judicial Lens: Competing Legitimation
Frameworks in the ICTY's Plavgie and Babi6 Judgments, 44 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 279 (2015).
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within a tribunal, as opposed variations between tribunals.20 Carlson's scholarship
looks for ways to reconcile two seminal judgments in the comparable cases of
Biljana Plavgi6 and Milan Babi. 2 1 As Carlson points out, the cases were relatively
congruent in timing and gravity but the ICTY viewed them radically differently.22
While Van Schaack's article is unprecedented in its exhaustive study of variations
between tribunals, Carlson's approach is similarly thorough in its study of the
functioning in a single institution. Moreover, Carlson's article examines in depth
how a tribunal's own politics and social considerations subtly shift from month to
month.
Lastly, the undersigned authors offer their own submission to complement he
other superb works. Our article is entitled A Digest of the Case Law of Contempt
of Court at International Criminal Tribunals and the International Criminal Court.
This piece is an exhaustive compilation of the jurisprudence on cases of contempt
of court that have occurred at the various tribunals and courts prosecuting core
23crimes. It is written in the style of two major works done by Human Rights
Watch. One was a compilation of digests of the law from the judgments at he
ICTY called Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, A Topical
Digest of the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia.24 A similar work was done for the ICTR.25 In the view of the authors,
these two articles are two of the most important works of scholarship ever done on
law of the ad hoc tribunals. They did not cover the law on contempt, however, and
we hope our article is a worthy addition.
Aside from what we anticipate is the utility of the articles in this edition of the
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, we hope these articles have
another lesson for readers. Namely, that no matter what the questions of
legitimacy and performance are that may dog a particular tribunal, the decisions
and judgments emanating from a tribunal become part of international law. So
while the institutions themselves may remain subject to debate, the fact that the
decisions and judgments issued by their courts continue add to the growing body
of international criminal law is beyond dispute..
20. See generally Carlson, supra note 19; but see generally Van Schaack, supra note 17.
21. See generally, Carlson, supra note 19.
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